Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials by Glasser, Michael H.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 3 Article 5
1997
Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous
Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials
Michael H. Glasser
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael H. Glasser, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 659 (1997) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol24/iss3/5
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
LETTING THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE:  
NONUNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
 
Michael H. Glasser
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPRING 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 3
 
Recommended citation: Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: 
Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659 (1997).  
659
LETTING THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE:
NONUNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS
MICHAEL H. GLASSER
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 659
II. THE ROOTS OF TODAY’S AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM .............................................. 661
A. The Origins of the Right to a Jury Trial .................................................... 661
B. The Origins of the Unanimity Requirement............................................... 663
III. THE MOVE TOWARD A SUPERMAJORITY RULE..................................................... 665
A. Johnson v. Louisiana.................................................................................. 665
B. Apodaca v. Oregon...................................................................................... 668
C. The Aftermath............................................................................................. 670
IV. THE SUPERMAJORITY SHOULD RULE .................................................................. 671
A. Behavioral Differences Between Unanimous and Nonunanimous Juries
Fail to Indicate a Unanimous Jury Is Superior......................................... 671
B. Why Abandon Unanimity? ......................................................................... 675
C. A Proposal for a Nonunanimous Scheme ................................................... 676
V. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 677
I.   INTRODUCTION
This jury and you and this trial with that verdict have let loose a
monster in our country that will pursue us for eons to come. Our
justice system in the country is the laughingstock of other coun-
tries, and now they can claim their right to laugh, where our
President is shot in plain view of the public and Jim Brady’s life is
ruined. How much more proof is there that our justice system is sick
when this crime proves that the victims lose, not the criminals.1
Many recent criminal jury verdicts have evoked the public’s frus-
tration with the justice system in the United States. New York State
Supreme Court Justice Harold J. Rothwax speaks for many others
when he says that criminal trials “too often produce results that are
inaccurate or unjust.”2 Many Americans have thus called for radical
reforms.3
Although the rate of violent crimes committed in the United
States has declined recently,4 Americans are still concerned about
the level of crime in their communities.5 In many neighborhoods, it
                                                                                                                 
1. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 182 (1986) (quoting a letter
sent from a couple in Alabama to Judge Barrington Parker, who presided over the John
Hinckley, Jr., trial).
2. HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23 (1996).
3. See, e.g., HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 182.
4. See Fox Butterfield, Serious Crime Decreased for Fifth Year in a Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1997, at 10.
5. See Yolanda Balido, S. Dade Gets 10 New Police Officers; Activists Want More,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15, 1996, at SS3; Elaine De Valle, Gables Anti-Crime Panel Gets
Down to Work, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 1996, at CT3.
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is a gamble to walk to the local store at night. Regardless of whether
the criminal justice system needs small modifications, or even a
complete overhaul, one thing seems clear in the wake of the crime
problem: better ways must be found to keep streets safe. Certainly,
no one factor is solely responsible for the crime problem. Neverthe-
less, when obviously guilty murderers, rapists, abusive husbands,
and armed robbers leave the courthouse unpunished, law-abiding
citizens no longer feel as safe. Nor should they. Recidivism rates are
high in the United States.6 Ultimately, citizens must rely upon the
courts to prevent criminals from striking again.
The jury is considered “the jewel and the centerpiece” of the
American justice system.7 Those who hail this system as the best in
the world are generally referring to the jury.8 The jury represents
the people “standing between a possibly oppressive government and
the lonely, accused individual.”9 Too frequently, however, juries ac-
quit blatantly guilty defendants, convict obviously guilty defendants
of much lesser offenses, fail to deliberate sufficiently, or fail to
reach a verdict in cases with overwhelming evidence.10 Injustices
in the jury system have prompted many scholars to advocate its
overhaul.11
A hung jury is one that is “so irreconcilably divided in opinion
that [it] cannot agree upon any verdict by the required unanimity.”12
Hung juries have been criticized for wasting significant amounts of
time and money.13 They are burdensome to defendants, witnesses,
victims, and already crowded courts.14 A second trial drains state
treasuries and places tremendous emotional and financial strains on
defendants.15 Hung juries either allow the prosecution to benefit
from an earlier “dress rehearsal” or prevent the prosecution from re-
trying the case because of time or money considerations or problems
with witnesses.16 Further, hung juries give the public the impression
                                                                                                                 
6. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83
CAL. L. REV. 885, 896 (1995) (stating that the recidivism rate for “robbery among previ-
ously convicted robbers was 19.6%, for assault was 21.9%, for burglary was 31.9%, for lar-
ceny was 33.5%, and for drug offenses was 24.8%”).
7. ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 199.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 200 (referring to the Rodney King trial, the Reginald Denny trial, the
O.J. Simpson trial, and the first Menendez brothers trial, respectively).
11. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1995).
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 630 A.2d 1064, 1076-77 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J., dissent-
ing).
14. See State v. Labanowski, 816 P.2d 26, 34 (Wash. 1991).
15. See id.
16. Id.
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that the justice system is not working.17 Statistics show that hung
juries cause a mistrial in five to twelve percent of the more than
200,000 felony criminal jury trials that occur in the United States
each year.18 Reducing the frequency of hung juries without sacrific-
ing justice should be a priority to increase the efficiency of the
criminal justice system.
This Comment analyzes whether permitting supermajority ver-
dicts is one means to achieve this goal. Part II of this Comment re-
views the evolution of our current jury system, including the origins
of the unanimity requirement. Part III examines how the United
States Supreme Court abandoned the unanimity requirement by
finding that it is not constitutionally required. Part IV compares the
behavioral traits of unanimity-rule juries with majority-rule juries.
Part IV also proposes a system for allowing supermajority verdicts.
Finally, Part V concludes that permitting nonunanimous verdicts
will enhance efficiency and promote justice.
II.   THE ROOTS OF TODAY’S AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM
[A]fter two hundred years, the debate over the jury system, with
distinguished participants on both sides, is still going on apace.19
A.   The Origins of the Right to a Jury Trial
The right to a jury trial is deeply embedded in the American
democratic ethos.20 Jury trials existed in England for several centu-
ries before the United States Constitution was written.21 The jury
trial system came to this country with English colonists, who
strongly supported the concept.22 The colonists frowned upon gov-
ernment interference with the jury trial.23 In one of the resolutions it
adopted on October 19, 1765, the Stamp Act Congress declared that
a jury trial “is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
                                                                                                                 
17. See Sawyer, 630 A.2d at 1077 (Katz, J., dissenting).
18. See id. Justice Katz’s dissent referred to two studies. The Chicago Jury Project
found hung juries in 5.5% of cases studied by Kalven and Ziesel. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 57 (1966). A California jury study determined hung ju-
ries resulted in 12.2% of the cases. See Leo J. Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the Jury Is
Deadlocked?, 61 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1977).
19. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 7.
20. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 31.
21. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Cooley ed. 1899)). While some scholars had
traced the origin of the jury trial to the Magna Carta, modern historians now reject this
view. See id. at 151 n.16 (citing 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 173 n.3 (2d ed. 1909)).
22. See id. at 152.
23. See id.
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subject in these colonies.”24 These resolutions were deemed to con-
tain “the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists.”25
Adopted in 1791, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guaranteed to all criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed.”26 This provision of the Sixth
Amendment was essentially superfluous, however.27 Article III, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution already mandated that all
criminal trials, except those for impeachment, were to be heard by a
jury.28 The right to trial by jury in criminal cases was among the few
guarantees of individual rights enumerated in the Constitution.29
Further, it is the lone guarantee listed in both the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights.30
Even before the Declaration of Independence, the First Continen-
tal Congress’s Declaration of Rights of 1774 had provided for the
right to trial by jury.31 Twelve states had enacted written constitu-
tions before the Constitutional Convention.32 The criminal defen-
dant’s right to trial by jury was the only right that was guaranteed
unanimously among these states.33 The constitution of every state
that has since entered the Union also has recognized the right to
trial by jury.34 Other countries opt to use the jury system with much
less frequency than the United States.35 It is estimated that eighty
                                                                                                                 
24. Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress 1765 ¶ 7, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 270 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952). The Stamp Act Congress
comprised nine colonies meeting in New York in October 1765. See Eric Grant, A Revolu-
tionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 144, 153 (1996). The Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (Eng.), gave the vice-admiralty
courts, which operated without juries, jurisdiction over actions brought to enforce stamp
tax penalties and forfeitures. See id. § 48.
25. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 24, at 270.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869 (1994).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”).
29. Other guarantees of individual rights in the Constitution are the Habeas Corpus
Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl.
3, the Obligation of Contracts Clause, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, the Treason Clause, id. art. III,
§ 3, cl. 1, the Corruption of Blood Clause, id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, id. art. IV, § 1, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
30. Altschuler and Deiss note that “[l]ess explicitly, the First Amendment may have
reiterated Article VI’s prohibition of religious tests for office-holding.” Altschuler & Deiss,
supra note 27, at 870 n.13 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 US 488, 491-93 (1961)).
31. See id. at 870 (citing 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at
69 (Oct. 14, 1774) (U.S. G.P.O., 1904)).
32. See id.
33. See id. (citing Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 258, 269 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987)).
34. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
35. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 31 (“England, Scotland, Wales, and Canada
do not have as liberal a standard [as the United States] concerning trial by jury.”).
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percent of all jury trials worldwide occur in this country.36 Thus, it is
especially critical that legislators and citizens frequently evaluate
the jury system to ensure its continued fairness and efficiency. The
requirement that all jurors must assent to render a verdict is but
one example of a feature in the American system that has not been
scrutinized sufficiently.37
B.   The Origins of the Unanimity Requirement
During the latter half of the fourteenth century, it became settled
in England that a jury’s verdict had to be unanimous.38 Although the
reasons for the development of the unanimity rule are unclear, at
least four possible explanations have been suggested.39
One theory traces the unanimity requirement back to trial by
compurgation, an early form of the jury trial.40 In a trial by compur-
gation, a judge continued to add jurors to the original panel of
twelve until twelve people agreed to vote for one of the parties in the
case.41 When this method of adding jurors was abandoned, the rule
that twelve jurors must agree upon a verdict remained.42
A second theory is that the unanimity requirement arose to com-
pensate the defendant for the lack of sufficient legal and procedural
rules that insured a fair trial.43 Penalties for convicted defendants
were severe at common law.44 The unanimity requirement might
thus have provided some protection for the accused.45
A third theory suggests that jury unanimity developed because,
unlike juries today, early juries possessed personal knowledge of the
facts of a case.46 In medieval times, it was presumed that only one
view of the facts was correct.47 If the jurors failed to agree unani-
mously upon a version of the facts, either the minority or majority of
                                                                                                                 
36. See id.
37. See e.g., ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 213.
38. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1972) (citing 1 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (1956)).
39. See id.
40. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171; see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2
(citing William Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 MISS. L.J. 185,
191 (1950)).
41. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171-72.
42. See id. at 172.
43. See id.; see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 n.2 (citing Ryan, Less than Unanimous
Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 211, 213 (1967)).
44. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171-72.
45. See id.
46. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 n.2 (citing THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956)); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1,
at 172.
47. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172.
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jurors would be punished for perjury.48 Thus, there was considerable
incentive for unanimity.49
A fourth explanation for the development of jury unanimity stems
from the medieval concept of consent.50 The word “consent” implied
the idea of concordance or unanimity.51 In England, the practice of
requiring unanimity continued to gain acceptance during the four-
teenth century.52 Evidence exists that Parliament deemed a majority
vote inadequate to bind the community or individuals to a legal de-
cision.53 As the unanimity requirement became extremely difficult to
satisfy in the fifteenth century, Parliament changed to a majoritar-
ian decisionmaking process.54 The requirement of jury unanimity
in criminal cases, however, remained intact in England until re-
cently.55
The United States was not as quick to follow England’s lead in
adopting the unanimity requirement.56 Although England retained
what was primarily a unanimity requirement until 1967,57 the idea
of requiring jury unanimity took some time to secure a place in the
American legal system.58 During the seventeenth century, four
states explicitly permitted majority verdicts in their constitutions.59
However, because various legal scholars supported the unanimity
rule, and as Americans became more familiar with the details of the
English common law and adopted these details in their own colonial
legal systems, unanimity became the accepted rule in the United
States during the eighteenth century.60 In 1972, nearly two centuries
after its unquestioned acceptance, the rule’s applicability to the
states became the subject of two landmark cases decided by the U.S
Supreme Court on the same day.61
                                                                                                                 
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (citing MAUDE V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REP-
RESENTATION AND CONSENT 251 (1964)).
51. See id.
52. See id. (citing Theodore F. Plucknett, The Lancastrian Constitution, in TUDOR
STUDIES 161, 169-70 (R. Seton-Watson ed. 1924)).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 407-08 n.2 (citing 1 KENNETH W. PICKTHORN, EARLY TUDOR GOV-
ERNMENT: HENRY VII, at 93 (1967)).
55. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172.
56. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08 (citing John M. Murrin, The Legal Transforma-
tion: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA:
ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 415 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971)).
57. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172.
58. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08.
59. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 n.45 (1970) (listing Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, North Carolina, and South Carolina as the states that authorized majority ver-
dicts).
60. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 408 n.3 (citing Murrin, supra note 56, at 415).
61. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
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III.   THE MOVE TOWARD A SUPERMAJORITY RULE
As it did in embracing the unanimity requirement, England acted
before the United States in abolishing the centuries-old rule.62 In
1967, after discovering that jurors had been bribed and intimidated
to acquit criminal defendants, England passed a law that permitted
a jury in a criminal trial to conclude deliberations and return a ver-
dict when a majority of eleven to one or ten to two was established.63
To prevent a jury from reaching a verdict without deliberating suf-
ficiently, the law mandated that a jury deliberate for at least two
hours or whatever the judge thought was a reasonable time.64 Eng-
land’s Secretary of State for the Home Office, Roy Jenkins, defended
the reform:
[Majority verdicts] are not likely to result in different verdicts in
many cases, but those few cases may well be crucial from the point
of view of law enforcement and the breaking-up of big criminal
conspiracies. . . . The disagreements undoubtedly occur in certain
cases, not because one or two jurors are borderline—quite the re-
verse—but because one or two jurors have been persuaded, by brib-
ery or intimidation, to hold out against the evidence. . . . [To] allow
criminal interference with juries, which is very difficult to prove ex-
cept where it fails, to enable big criminals to frustrate the process of
justice, is to fight crime with our hands tied behind our backs.65
Five years later, in Johnson v. Louisana 66 and Apodaca v. Oregon ,67
the U.S. Supreme Court followed England’s lead by finding that
unanimity is not constitutionally required.
A.   Johnson v. Louisiana
Frank Johnson was arrested in Louisiana on January 20, 1968.68
An armed robbery victim had identified Johnson as the perpetrator
of the crime from photographs.69 Johnson was subsequently identi-
fied at a lineup by a victim of yet another robbery.70 Although John-
son pleaded not guilty to the second robbery charge, he was tried by
                                                                                                                 
62. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172.
63. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80 (Eng.); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note
1, at 172.
64. See sources cited supra note 63.
65. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172 (quoting Roy Jenkins).
66. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
67. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
68. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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twelve jurors, and was convicted by a nine-to-three verdict.71 The
Louisiana Constitution provided:
Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor, shall be
tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict;
cases, in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a
jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases
in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of
whom must concur to render a verdict.72
Similarly, the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure authorized
nine-to-three verdicts in cases in which the punishment was neces-
sarily at hard labor.73 Johnson raised due process and equal protec-
tion challenges to the Louisiana constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, which the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected.74 The U.S. Su-
preme Court agreed to hear Johnson’s claims.75 According to the
Court, the principal question in Johnson’s case was whether the
Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions, which allowed
majority verdicts in certain cases, violated either the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
With respect to his due process claim, Johnson argued that to
satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard mandated to the
states by the Due Process Clause, a unanimous jury verdict was re-
quired in all criminal cases.77 In considering Johnson’s claim, the
Court elected to break down the due process argument into two is-
sues: (1) whether nine individuals can “vote conscientiously in favor
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when three of their colleagues are
arguing for acquittal”; and (2) whether guilt can be said “to have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt when one or more [jurors] at
the conclusion of deliberation still possess such a doubt.”78
In answering the first issue in the affirmative, the majority, in an
opinion written by Justice White, found no reason to believe that the
nine jurors who voted to convict Johnson failed to follow the trial
judge’s instructions regarding the need for proof beyond a reason-
able doubt or that any juror’s vote failed to reflect a sincere belief
that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had been proved.79 Specifically,
the Court reasoned:
                                                                                                                 
71. See id.
72. Id. at 357-58 n.1 (quoting LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41).
73. See id. at 358 n.1 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782).
74. See id. at 358.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 357-58.
77. See id. at 359.
78. Id. at 360.
79. See id. at 360-61.
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[T]he mere fact that three jurors voted to acquit does not in itself
demonstrate that, had the nine jurors of the majority attended fur-
ther to reason and the evidence, all or one of them would have de-
veloped a reasonable doubt about guilt. We have no grounds for
believing that majority jurors, aware of their responsibility and
power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to lis-
ten to arguments presented to them in favor of acquittal, termi-
nate discussion, and render a verdict. On the contrary it is far
more likely that a juror presenting reasoned argument in favor of
acquittal would either have his arguments answered or would
carry enough other jurors with him to prevent conviction. A major-
ity will cease discussion and outvote a minority only after reasoned
discussion has ceased to have persuasive effect or to serve any other
purpose—when a minority . . . continues to insist upon acquittal
without having persuasive reasons in support of its position.80
In considering the second part of Johnson’s due process claim, the
Court acknowledged that if the State had convinced all twelve ju-
rors, rather than nine, the prosecution’s proof could have been re-
garded as “more certain.”81 In rejecting Johnson’s argument, how-
ever, the Court concluded that the disagreement of three jurors did
not “indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard.”82 In sup-
port of its position, the Court noted that jury verdicts finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt were frequently upheld, even where the
jury would have been justified in possessing a reasonable doubt
based upon the evidence.83 To illustrate that lack of jury unanimity
should not be equated with reasonable doubt, the Court emphasized
that when a federal jury—which operates under the unanimity re-
quirement and which must acquit a defendant if it possesses a rea-
sonable doubt about his or her guilt—failed to agree unanimously
upon a verdict, the defendant was not acquitted.84 Rather, he or she
was subjected to a new trial.85
With respect to his equal protection claim, Johnson argued that
the constitutional and statutory provisions disadvantaged him when
compared with defendants who committed other classifications of
                                                                                                                 
80. Id. at 361.
81. Id. at 362.
82. Id.
83. See id.
Jury verdicts finding guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are regularly sustained
even though the evidence was such that the jury would have been justified in
having a reasonable doubt, even though the trial judge might not have reached
the same conclusion as the jury, and even though appellate judges are closely
divided on the issue whether there was sufficient evidence to support a convic-
tion.
Id. (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 363 (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910)).
85. See id.
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crimes.86 Cases involving less serious crimes were tried by only five
jurors, all of whom had to concur to render a verdict, while capital
cases were tried by twelve jurors, all of whom had to concur to ren-
der a verdict.87 The Court dismissed this argument as well, in part
because a state is constitutionally permitted to treat accused capital
offenders differently than those accused of committing lesser
crimes.88 The Court also elected to defer to the Louisiana Legisla-
ture’s judgment because the Legislature had the discretion to vary
the difficulty of obtaining a conviction with the severity of the pun-
ishment and the gravity of the crime.89
Four justices dissented in four separate opinions.90 Two justices
joined in Justice Stewart’s dissent, which cited several cases uphold-
ing the right of all citizens to participate on a jury.91 Justice Stewart
argued that the Court’s decision undermined this right, claiming
that “only a unanimous jury . . . can serve to minimize the poten-
tial bigotry of those who might convict on inadequate evidence, or
acquit when evidence of guilt was clear.”92 Further, Justice
Stewart argued that community confidence in the administration
of criminal justice would be diminished by the Court’s authoriza-
tion of majority verdicts.93
B.   Apodaca v. Oregon
Decided on the same day as Johnson, Apodaca v. Oregon ,94 the
second landmark case regarding the unanimity requirement, pre-
sented the Court with similar constitutional challenges. Three
criminal defendants were convicted of crimes by separate Oregon
juries, all of which returned nonunanimous verdicts.95 After their
appeals in the Oregon courts were unsuccessful, all three defendants
sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that conviction
                                                                                                                 
86. See id. at 363-64.
87. See id. at 364.
88. See id. (“Appellant might well have been ultimately acquitted had he committed a
capital offense. But . . . this does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the law; the
State may treat capital offenders differently without violating the constitutional rights of
those charged with lesser crimes.”).
89. See id. at 365.
90. See id. at 380-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 399-403 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Justice Stewart’s dissent. See id. at 397.
92. Id. at 398.
93. See id. (“[C]ommunity confidence in the administration of criminal justice cannot
but be corroded under a system in which a defendant who is conspicuously identified with
a particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along group lines.”).
94. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
95. See id. at 405-06.
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of a crime by a nonunanimous jury verdict violated the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury.96
The Oregon Constitution permitted nonunanimous jury verdicts
in certain criminal cases.97 Specifically, article I, section 11 provided:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense
shall have been committed; . . . provided, however, that any ac-
cused person, in other than capital cases, and with the consent of
the trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be
tried by the judge of the court alone, such election to be in writing;
provided, however, that in the circuit court ten members of the
jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a
verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only
by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise . . . .98
The Court took the same approach to considering the importance
of the unanimity requirement as it did in an earlier case, in which it
considered whether a jury size of twelve was constitutionally re-
quired.99 After reviewing the origins of the unanimity requirement,
the plurality, in another opinion written by Justice White, focused
on the jury’s role in contemporary society.100 The Court noted that
the jury’s primary function was to protect the accused from the
“corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge.”101 Given this purpose, the Court found that the una-
nimity requirement was not an indispensable feature of the criminal
justice system.102 The Court reasoned that a jury would protect the
accused, regardless of the unanimity rule, as long as it was com-
posed of “a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the
community who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate,
free from outside attempts at intimidation.”103 Obviously, the Court
observed, abandoning the unanimity requirement would produce
fewer hung juries, thereby resulting in more convictions or acquit-
tals.104 The Court concluded, however, that in either instance, the in-
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terest in having the common-sense judgment of a jury interposed be-
tween the defendant and the government was equally well safe-
guarded.105
The second argument put forth by the petitioners was that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that the unanimity
requirement be preserved in criminal trials to give substance to the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, which is mandated by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.106 The Court re-
sponded by noting that the reasonable-doubt standard developed in-
dependently from both the right to a trial by jury and the unanimity
rule.107 Further, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard did not
fully develop in America until after the Constitution was adopted.108
The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.109 Thus, the petitioners’ reason-
able-doubt argument had to be premised upon due process, which
the Court had previously ruled in Johnson was not violated by a
nonunanimous verdict.110
The final argument advanced by the petitioners was that a
unanimous verdict was necessary to uphold the Fourteenth
Amendment’s  requirement that juries reflect a cross section of the
community.111 This argument also proved unavailing.112 The Court
reasoned that the Constitution merely forbade “systematic exclusion
of identifiable segments of the community from jury panels.”113 Thus,
the petitioners’ assumption that every group in the community has a
right to be represented on every jury was flawed.114 Permitting
nonunanimous verdicts does not prevent effective application of the
cross-section requirement.115
C.   The Aftermath
The Johnson and Apodaca decisions only authorized nonunani-
mous verdicts in state criminal trials.116 The unanimity requirement
endures in federal criminal trials.117 Justice Powell, in his concur-
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ring opinion in Johnson, asserted that “unanimity had long been es-
tablished as one of the attributes of a jury conviction at common
law” by the time the Bill of Rights were adopted.118 Therefore, he ar-
gued that history and precedent dictated that the Sixth Amendment
required a federal criminal defendant to be convicted by a unani-
mous verdict.119
Despite the Supreme Court’s authorization of nonunanimous
verdicts in state criminal cases, most state legislatures have de-
clined to deviate from the unanimity requirement in criminal
cases.120 While thirty-three states allow nonunanimous verdicts in
civil cases, only two permit them in criminal cases.121 Perhaps many
states are simply following common-law tradition in preserving the
unanimity rule in criminal trials. Perhaps tradition has prompted
them to ignore the compelling arguments made in favor of abandon-
ing the rule. For example, in 1994, a commission appointed by the
chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals to evaluate the jury
system failed to address the subject of unanimity because of its con-
troversial nature.122 While those who have the power to act have ig-
nored the issue, many scholars continue to debate the merits of the
unanimity rule.123 Much of the debate is focused on the differences in
deliberation between a jury required to reach a unanimous verdict
and one permitted to reach a majority verdict.
IV.   THE SUPERMAJORITY SHOULD RULE
A.   Behavioral Differences Between Unanimous and Nonunanimous
Juries Fail to Indicate a Unanimous Jury Is Superior
In their renowned jury study, Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and
Nancy Pennington found six differences between behavior on una-
nimity-rule juries and behavior on majority-rule juries.124 First, ma-
jority-rule juries render a verdict more quickly.125 Second, majority-
rule juries tend to adopt a verdict-driven deliberation style, in which
jurors vote early and conduct discussions in an adversarial manner,
rather than an evidence-driven style, in which jurors first discuss
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the evidence as one group and vote later.126 Third, majority-rule ju-
ries generally vote sooner than unanimity-rule juries.127 Fourth,
majority-rule jurors are more likely to remain holdouts at the con-
clusion of deliberations.128 Fifth, members of small groups are less
likely to speak on a majority-rule jury.129 Finally, large factions at-
tract members more quickly on a majority-rule jury.130
Proponents of the unanimity requirement claim these differences
indicate the unanimity rule is superior to the majority scheme.131
However, when each factor is independently analyzed, the differ-
ences do not illustrate that the unanimity rule is better.
With respect to the first difference—that majority-rule juries take
less time to render a verdict132—the minimal disparity in time is un-
likely to affect the verdict’s accuracy.133 The most comprehensive
jury study done in the last thirty years suggests that the first-ballot
vote is the same as the verdict in approximately nine out of ten
cases.134 Thus, the outcome of the case is frequently decided before
any significant deliberation.135 In their study, Kalven and Zeisel
went so far as to conclude that the “deliberation process might well
be likened to what the developer does for an exposed film: it brings
out the picture, but the outcome is pre-determined.”136 Even in the
small percentage of cases where the initial minority might succeed
in reversing the initial majority, there is nothing to suggest that
majority-rule juries, which take less time to render a verdict, simply
ignore the rational arguments forwarded by jurors in the minority.
Rather, it is more likely that unanimity-rule juries take slightly
more time to render a verdict to persuade the final one or two hold-
outs.
The second difference—that majority-rule juries tend to adopt a
verdict-driven deliberation style instead of an evidence-driven
style137—is a matter of negligible concern. The law often encourages
juries, through the use of special verdicts, to employ a verdict-driven
style.138 In verdict-driven juries, the adversarial discussions do not
impede the jury’s ability to decide the facts based upon the evidence.
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If anything, adversarial discussions encourage opposing views of the
facts to be analyzed and heard by everyone. In his dissent in John-
son, Justice Douglas expressed concern that the “polite and aca-
demic conversation” in which he apparently felt majority-rule juries
engaged was “no substitute for the earnest and robust argument
necessary to reach unanimity.”139 This concern seems unfounded for
two reasons. First, as noted above, majority-rule juries, far from en-
gaging in “polite and academic conversation,” are verdict-driven,
voting at the beginning of deliberation and proceeding to enter into a
verbal tug-of-war.140 Second, the supposed “earnest and robust ar-
gument” in which unanimity-rule jurors must engage to reach a
unanimous verdict is more often “intimidation and peer pressure.”141
Further, in Judge Rothwax’s own experience, “[i]n every instance . . .
where the jury was split ten to two or eleven to one, . . . the holdout
was not being rational.”142 Therefore, a unanimous verdict appears
no more reliable than a verdict in which a supermajority (ten to two
or eleven to one) is reached.143
The third difference—that majority-rule juries vote sooner than
unanimity-rule juries144—is also an unfounded concern. Jurors are
instructed by the judge to refrain from talking to other jurors about
the case they are trying until deliberation begins. This allows jurors
to formulate their own impressions about the evidence. However,
once deliberation begins, jurors are supposed to share, not conceal,
their views of the case. There is nothing wrong with taking a vote
when deliberation begins to see where the group stands. If a requi-
site majority is immediately established, but the dissenting jurors
feel strongly about their position, the majority jurors will hear them
out because they possess a heightened sense of responsibility. Al-
though this notion of responsibility is not free from dispute, in some
areas, a majority-rule jury is likely to feel more responsibility.145 “[A]
juror in a verdict-rendering majority under a nonunanimous deci-
sion rule is more likely to feel responsibility. Typically fewer jurors
render the verdict, and often they render the verdict in the face of
persistent opposition from an outvoted minority faction.”146
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The fourth difference—that majority-rule jurors are more likely
to remain holdouts147—does not undermine confidence in majority-
rule verdicts. Justice Powell once declared that the unanimity re-
quirement leads “not to full agreement among the twelve but to
agreement by none and compromise by all.”148 That majority-rule ju-
rors may be less willing to compromise does not diminish the reli-
ability of the verdict.149 In the Hastie study, jurors were asked post-
deliberation questions about their confidence in the verdicts they
had rendered.150 The confidence level among juries required to reach
a ten-to-two verdict was higher than among unanimity-rule juries.151
Even the holdout jurors on majority-rule juries expressed greater
confidence in the verdict than did the jurors on unanimity-rule ju-
ries.152
The fifth difference—that small groups are less likely to speak in
majority-rule juries153—does not hold up on closer examination. In-
dividual personality traits would appear to dictate the extent of each
juror’s contribution during deliberations and willingness to vehe-
mently defend his or her position more than the fact of service on a
unanimity- or majority-rule jury. The author of this Comment re-
cently served on a six-person, unanimity-rule criminal jury. The ju-
rors were disinclined to speak each time they had to wait in the jury
room during brief recesses. Even when the jury retired to deliberate,
none of the jurors seemed willing to express his or her view of the
facts. The author wanted to take a vote because discussion of the
case was virtually nonexistent. The vote revealed that three were in
favor of guilt and three were in favor of acquittal. One would think
that a split vote would generate vigorous debate. Instead, only two
other jurors (one from each side) defended their positions. Finally,
the author asked the others why they had voted the way they did.
Twenty minutes later, the jury reached a unanimous decision. The
quality of deliberation would not have suffered had this been a ma-
jority-rule jury. Half of the jurors appeared to be reserved and likely
would not have spoken up as members of a small group—especially
if they were the lone dissenting vote—regardless of whether the jury
was operating under a unanimity or majority rule.
Even where dissenting jurors would be willing to assert them-
selves, a majority-rule scheme would encourage them to speak up
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more than a unanimity-rule scheme because they would need to per-
suade fewer jurors to change the verdict. Assume, for example, that
on a unanimity-rule jury there were nine votes in favor of guilt and
three in favor of acquittal. To obtain an acquittal, the three dissent-
ers would have to persuade all nine remaining jurors to change their
votes. The difficulty of achieving this task is obvious, and the three
jurors frequently would either succumb to the will (and reason) of
the majority or hold out to create a hung jury. However, if the same
situation arose on a majority-rule jury, with, for example, a ten-to-
two majority, the three jurors in the minority only would need to
convince seven of the remaining nine jurors to change the verdict.
This is a lesser hurdle, perhaps prompting the three jurors to pas-
sionately argue their position.
Finally, the sixth difference—that large groups attract members
more rapidly on a majority-rule jury154—is not a concern at all. There
is nothing wrong with such an attraction given that majority-rule
jurors are less likely to compromise.155 For the large group to attract
the small group, which is uncompromising, the large group’s argu-
ment likely would have to be very compelling.
These six behavioral differences fail to indicate the unanimity
rule’s superiority over the majority rule. In fact, some of the behav-
ioral characteristics of majority-rule juries, as set out above, are
preferable to characteristics of unanimity-rule juries. Moreover, nu-
merous arguments exist in favor of developing a sensible nonunani-
mous scheme.
B.   Why Abandon Unanimity?
Adopting the majority rule will significantly reduce the frequency
of hung juries.156 Kalven and Zeisel noted that jurisdictions which
allow nonunanimous verdicts have forty-five percent fewer hung ju-
ries than those that compel unanimity.157 The benefits of reducing
the number of hung juries are obvious. The criminal justice system
will function more efficiently, saving many people time, expense,
and the inconvenience of another trial, without reducing the ver-
dict’s reliability.158
Implementing a nonunanimous scheme would also negate the
impact of an eccentric or irrational holdout who prevents a jury from
reaching unanimity.159 The jury selection process allows for a jury to
be composed of people who are emotional, suggestible, gullible, or
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even intellectually incapable of evaluating complex evidence.160 The
criminal justice system should not allow a hung jury in a robbery
case on the basis of one juror who sleeps during a crucial witness’s
testimony, claiming that he or she doesn’t “really have to listen to
every word” because he or she “can tell whether someone is telling
the truth by looking at the way he moves his eyebrows.”161 Nor
should we tolerate a hung jury in a murder case due to one holdout’s
strong belief that the defendant was innocent because “[s]omeone
that good-looking could not commit such a crime.”162
Many analogies to other systems in the United States also sug-
gest the reasonableness of adopting a nonunanimous scheme.163
Legislatures generally utilize a “majority rules” system.164 Voters
abide by a “majority rules” premise.165 Appellate courts and grand
juries also employ a “majority rules” scheme, even in criminal
cases.166 Requiring unanimity is an outdated tradition.167 The rule
originally drew strength from various “metaphysical and religious
ideas about Truth that are no longer plausible.”168 It is time for our
justice system to adopt a nonunanimous scheme that governs all
cases.
C.   A Proposal for a Nonunanimous Scheme
Many proponents of preserving the unanimity rule argue that a
nonunanimous scheme allows jurors in the majority to ignore the
arguments of jurors in the minority once the requisite number of as-
senting jurors is attained. A successful plan must ensure thorough
deliberation before a verdict is rendered. Several factors will en-
courage this ideal. First, the jurors’ own consciences frequently will
prompt further discussions even after the necessary majority is es-
tablished. When a defendant’s life or freedom hangs in the balance,
jurors will feel an immense responsibility to consider every argu-
ment before returning a verdict. Otherwise, twelve laypeople should
not be entrusted in the first place to decide an accused citizen’s fate.
Second, the judge’s instructions to the jury should include a re-
minder to the jury that even when the requisite majority is achieved,
arguments and discussions should continue until the jurors “reach a
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point at which [they] believe that further deliberations will not af-
fect the verdict.”169
The number of assenting jurors required to render a verdict
should vary according to the gravity of the charge or severity of the
punishment. A practical plan would require an eleven-to-one major-
ity for capital cases. This would prevent one irrational juror from
allowing a violent criminal to escape justice while still requiring the
prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The lone
dissenter will have ample opportunity to express and support his or
her position. If the argument is reasonable, it will carry at least one
of the remaining eleven votes, thereby preventing a guilty verdict
from being rendered. Felony cases should require a ten-to-two ma-
jority, similar to the provision unsuccessfully challenged in Apo-
daca.170 In lesser criminal cases, a nine-to-three majority would suf-
fice to effectively balance the competing interests. The number of as-
senting jurors needed to render a verdict in civil cases should be
lower than in any criminal case because an individual’s freedom is
not at stake. Most states already permit nonunanimous verdicts in
civil cases.171 Thus, an eight-to-four majority should suffice in civil
cases.
V.   CONCLUSION
Tradition notwithstanding, change is inevitable over two hundred
years. Many people have lost faith in the criminal justice system. It
is necessary to evaluate frequently each feature of the system to de-
termine what improvements can be made. While the unanimity rule
is certainly not the exclusive source of the public’s frustration, per-
mitting nonunanimous verdicts may instill in the public a renewed
sense of trust in the system while promoting the efficient admini-
stration of justice.
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